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Space Exploration: Issues Concerning the
“Vision for Space Exploration”
Marcia S. Smith
Resources, Science, and Industry Division

Summary
On January 14, 2004, President George W. Bush announced new goals for the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), directing the agency to focus
on returning humans to the Moon by 2020, and eventually sending them to Mars and
“worlds beyond.” The President invited other countries to join. Most of the funding for
this “Vision for Space Exploration” is to be redirected from other NASA activities,
including terminating the space shuttle program in 2010, and ending U.S. participation
in the International Space Station by 2016. NASA released an implementation plan for
the Vision on September 19, 2005, and estimated the cost of returning humans to the
Moon by 2018 (NASA’s current goal) at $104 billion. An estimate for sending people
to Mars was not provided. This report identifies issues Congress has been considering
as it debates the President’s Vision. This is the final edition of this report; see CRS
Issue Brief IB92011, U.S. Space Programs: Civilian, Military, and Commercial, by
Marcia S. Smith, for further information.

Overview of President George W. Bush’s Vision for Space
Exploration
On January 14, 2004, President George W. Bush announced a new “Vision for Space
Exploration” [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040114-3.html].
Amplified by documents from the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
[http://www.ostp.gov] and NASA, the main features include the following.
!

!
!
!

Astronauts would return to the Moon in the 2015-2020 time period using
a new “Crew Exploration Vehicle” (CEV) to be developed by NASA.
(The last time Americans walked on the Moon was in 1972.)
Eventually, astronauts would go to Mars. No date was announced.
Robotic probes would serve as trailblazers for human explorers. The first
probe to support the Vision would be launched to the Moon in 2008.
Construction of the International Space Station (ISS) would be completed
by 2010. The President promised that the United States would meet its

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

CRS-2

!

!

!
!

!

obligations to its partners in the ISS program — Europe, Canada, Japan,
and Russia.1 U.S. involvement in ISS would end by 2016.
The space shuttle system would be retired in 2010. Between 2010 and
2014, when the CEV would be operational for Earth orbital missions,
U.S. astronauts would rely on Russia to take them to and from ISS.
NASA would redirect its research aboard the ISS to that which
specifically supports the Vision, instead of the broadly based research
program that was planned.
Other countries were invited to participate in the Vision.
A cost estimate was not provided, but FY2005 NASA budget documents
showed that $12.6 billion would be “added”2 to its budget for FY20052009 to begin implementing the Vision, and a NASA projected budget
chart (the “sand chart”3) suggested that $150-170 billion would be spent
on the Vision from FY2004-2020. Most of the money was to come from
other NASA programs. The $12.6 billion, for example, comprised $1
billion in new money, and $11.6 billion redirected from other activities.
A Commission on the Implementation of U.S. Space Exploration Policy
was created by the President to advise NASA on implementation of the
Vision; its report was issued in June 2004.

The speech came 11 months after the February 1, 2003, space shuttle Columbia
accident (see CRS Report RS21408), and two weeks after the January 3, 2004, successful
landing of a U.S. robotic probe (Spirit) on Mars. Invoking the explorations of Lewis and
Clark, the President explained that America has ventured into space for the same reasons,
“because the desire to explore and understand is part of our character. And that quest has
brought tangible benefits that improve our lives in countless ways.”

Public Reaction
An Associated Press-Ipsos poll conducted before the President’s speech, in response
to press reports that it was imminent, found 48% of the respondents in favor of a
Moon/Mars program, 48% opposed, and 4% not sure.4 A June 22-July 7, 2004 Gallup
poll sponsored by the Coalition for Space Exploration (a group of companies and
organizations that support the Vision) found that, in response to a question about funding
a Moon/Mars program as long as NASA’s budget did not exceed 1% of the federal
budget, 26% strongly supported, 42% supported, 15% opposed, and 9% strongly opposed
the plan. A similar poll a year later found that 26% strongly supported, 50.5% supported,
14% opposed, and 6.5% strongly opposed it. The remainder were neutral, did not know,
or did not answer. The polls are at [http://www.spacecoalition.com]. A CNN/USA

1

A 1998 Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA), and Memoranda of Understanding between
NASA and its counterparts, detail those obligations. See [[http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/oer/]].

2

The characterization of the $12.6 billion as an “addition” was based on a NASA assumption
that without the Vision, NASA would have been held to a flat budget. The “increase,” therefore,
was above a hypothetical budget that is lower than what NASA projected in its FY2004 budget.

3
4

The 2004 “sand chart” is at [http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/54873main_budget_chart_14jan04.pdf].

(1)”Results of AP Poll on Space Exploration,” Associated Press, Jan. 2, 2004, 14:44. (2) Will
Lester, “AP Poll: U.S. Tepid on Bush’s Space Plans,” Associated Press, Jan. 12, 2004, 14:50.
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Today/Gallup poll conducted at the same time as the 2005 poll for the Coalition found,
however, that 40% of those surveyed wanted to set money aside for a human trip to Mars,
while 58% were opposed [http://poll.gallup.com/content/default.aspx?ci=17224&pg=1].

Congressional Reaction
NASA’s oversight and funding committees (House Science, Senate Commerce, and
House and Senate Appropriations5) have held many hearings on the Vision and related
issues. Members of both parties have expressed support for the goal, but also concern
about the cost and the impact on other NASA activities and NASA’s workforce.
FY2005 Funding. For FY2005, Congress appropriated almost all the funding
NASA requested for all its activities (see CRS Report RL32676 for more information on
NASA’s FY2005 budget). Many Vision supporters considered that action as a sign of
congressional support. Conferees on the act, however, explicitly stated that although they
were appropriating substantial funds for the Vision, “to date there has been no substantive
Congressional action endorsing this initiative.” (H.Rept. 108-792, p. 1599).
FY2006 Funding. NASA’s total FY2006 budget request was $16.5 billion, a
2.4% increase over what was appropriated in the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations
Act (P.L. 108-447). If a $126 million FY2005 supplemental is added, NASA’s FY2005
total was $16.2 billion, and the FY2006 request was a 1.6% increase. By comparison,
the White House projected a 4.7% increase for FY2006 when it announced the Vision in
2004. CRS Report RL32988 describes NASA’s FY2006 budget in more detail.
Within NASA’s total budget request, what constitutes funding for the “Vision” is
open to interpretation. A NASA budget chart from February 2005 divided the FY2006
request into three categories: “exploration-specific,” $6 billion; “shuttle & space station,”
$6.4 billion; and “earth science, aeronautics, and others,” $4.1 billion. Some may
consider the Vision funding as that in the “exploration-specific” category, which
combines funding for the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) with many
programs in the Science Mission Directorate, such as robotic solar system exploration and
space telescopes. Others may add funding for the space shuttle and space station, since
those are often described as the first steps in the Vision. Alternatively, funding only for
ESMD ($3.2 billion) could be defined as funding for the Vision, which includes
development of the new Crew Exploration Vehicle and a launch vehicle for it.
Congress appropriated $16,456.8 million for NASA in the FY2006 Science, State,
Justice Commerce (SSJC) appropriations act (H.R. 2862, P.L. 109-108). It provides a net
increase of $500,000 above the requested level, but is subject to a 0.28% across-the-board
rescission in that act, and a 1% rescission in another appropriations act (P.L. 109-148).
In the SSJC act, Congress added approximately $500 million for specific projects or
activities and cut a similar amount. For ESMD, Congress cut $25 million from each of
the two research and technology programs as recommended by the House; $34 million

5

For FY2005, NASA was overseen by the VA-HUD-IA subcommittees in the House and Senate
appropriations committees. In the 109th Congress, NASA is part of the Science, State, Justice,
Commerce (SSJC) appropriations subcommittee in the House; and the Commerce, Justice,
Science (CJS) appropriations subcommittee in the Senate.
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from Centennial Challenges (which awards monetary prizes for developing solutions to
technological challenges set by NASA) as recommended by the Senate; and $200 million
from Project Prometheus (see below). Congress also passed a NASA authorization act in
2005 (P.L.109-155). It endorsed the President’s Vision, and authorized a total for NASA
of $17.9 billion in FY2007 and $18.7 billion in FY2008. Both figures are higher than the
out-year estimates in NASA’s FY2006 budget request ($17 billion for FY2007 and $17.3
billion for FY2008). Congress continues to stress that NASA should continue a balanced
set of programs, including science and aeronautics, not focus entirely on the Vision.

Comparison with the 1989 Space Exploration Initiative
Although some media stories portray President Bush’s speech as the first new vision
for NASA since the Apollo era, 6 President George H.W. Bush made a similar proposal
on July 20, 1989, the 20th anniversary of the first human landing the Moon. Known as the
Space Exploration Initiative (SEI), the senior President Bush directed that the space
station serve as a stepping stone to returning humans to the Moon and someday sending
them to Mars. In a May 1990 speech, he added more details, saying that he believed
humans would reach Mars by 2019. Richard Darman, then Director of the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), stated at a press conference the day of the President’s
original speech that fulfilling the Moon/Mars goals would cost $400 billion over 30 years.
Other estimates (some higher, some lower) were offered later by NASA.
SEI was announced during a period when Congress was attempting to reduce the
federal deficit, and the proposal was not received enthusiastically. Funding for SEI was
requested in the FY1991, FY1992, and FY1993 budgets, though what constituted “SEI
funding” changed during those years. For FY1991 NASA requested $953 million for SEI.
The FY1991 NASA authorization bill (P.L. 101-611) approved almost full funding, but
the appropriations bill essentially zeroed it (P.L. 101-507), although NASA was allowed
to reprogram $37 million into SEI for FY1991. For FY1992, the NASA request was $94
million; Congress approved $32 million. For FY1993, $64 million was requested. The
FY1993 NASA authorization bill (P.L. 102-588) approved approximately half of that; the
appropriations bill (P.L. 102-389) essentially zeroed it.

Implementing the Vision
Dr. Michael Griffin became NASA’s Administrator in April 2005. In the early
1990s, while the senior President Bush was in office, Dr. Griffin headed NASA’s SEI

6

The Apollo program was initiated by President John F. Kennedy in May 1961 to land a man on
the Moon and return him safely to Earth before the end of that decade. NASA first developed
experience with launching people into space, and extravehicular activities (EVAs, or
spacewalks), through the Mercury (1961-1963) and Gemini (1965-1966) programs. The first
Apollo mission was to be launched in 1967, but the crew died on January 27, 1967 when a fire
erupted in the Apollo command module during a pre-launch test. The first successful Apollo
mission was launched in 1968, and the first Americans landed on the Moon on July 20, 1969
(Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin, while pilot Michael Collins orbited above in the Apollo 11
spacecraft). A total of six two-man crews walked on the Moon from 1969-1972. Another crew
(Apollo 13) intended to land on the Moon in 1970, but made an emergency return to Earth when
the Service Module of their spacecraft exploded enroute to the Moon.
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program (see above). Dr. Griffin’s plans for implementing the Vision are somewhat
different from those of his predecessor, Mr. Sean O’Keefe.
Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) and Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV).
President Bush directed NASA to develop a CEV to take astronauts to and from the Moon.
He called for a demonstration flight by 2008, and an operational capability to Earth orbit
no later than 2014. During Mr. O’Keefe’s tenure, NASA would not commit to using the
CEV to take crews to and from the ISS, wanting to keep the CEV design clearly focused
on lunar transportation. Dr. Griffin, by contrast, has explicitly linked the CEV and the ISS.
It will take crews back and forth to the ISS, and serve as a “crew return” vehicle (or
lifeboat) for them. Mr. O’Keefe’s plan was to open a competition for industry teams to
design the CEV and conduct demonstration flights in 2008, after which a single contractor
would be selected to build an operational CEV by 2014. Dr. Griffin decided that NASA
itself should determine the basic design, and plans to award a single contract in 2006. He
hopes for an Earth-orbital operational capability by 2012. That would leave a multi-year
gap between the end of the shuttle and the availability of the CEV, during which time
NASA would be dependent on Russia for transporting NASA astronauts to the ISS.
The CEV needs a launch vehicle, which is designated the Crew Launch Vehicle
(CLV). The directive that NASA terminate the shuttle in 2010 refers to the shuttle in its
current configuration — an airplane-like Orbiter carrying crew and cargo, with two Solid
Rocket Boosters (SRBs) on each side, and a large, cylindrical External Tank (ET)
containing fuel for the Orbiter’s main engines. Dr. Griffin plans to develop two “shuttlederived” launch vehicles (SDLVs) using the SRBs and ET, but not the Orbiter. One is the
CLV, which will use one SRB and a new upper stage, with the CEV spacecraft on top.
The other is a “heavy lift” SDLV using the ET and SRBs, with a cargo carrying spacecraft
on top. For more information, see CRS Issue Brief IB93062.
Project Prometheus. NASA initiated this program to develop advanced nuclear
power and propulsion systems before the Vision was announced. Its original goal was
developing Nuclear Electric Propulsion (NEP) and advanced Radioisotope Thermoelectric
Generators (RTGs) for a robotic probe, called the Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter (JIMO), to
study three of Jupiter’s moons. RTGs have been used by NASA since the 1960s to supply
power for spacecraft systems and experiments on probes that travel so far from the Sun
that solar energy-based systems are impractical. RTGs also can be used for spacecraft that
land on surfaces where they will experience “night” for long periods. NASA has not used
nuclear propulsion, either NEP or a different type, Nuclear Thermal Propulsion (NTP), in
the past, although NASA worked on developing NTP in the 1960s and early 1970s. After
the Vision was announced, Prometheus took on greater importance because of its potential
for providing power and propulsion for human exploration, as well as robotic spacecraft.
However, the desire to accelerate development of the CEV means that funding must be
shifted to it from other NASA activities. Project Prometheus is one of those. Initially, Dr.
Griffin cut funds and refocused it on nuclear surface power systems (for use on the lunar
surface, e.g.) and NTP, with NEP as a third priority. In a September 30, 2005 update to
its operating plan, NASA announced it was further restructuring the program, yielding $76
million in FY2006 that would be redirected to the CEV/CLV program. JIMO was
canceled, and only low-level funding will be provided for key nuclear systems research
and technology issues. Funding for Prometheus was shifted back to the Science Mission
Directorate (where it originated), although the program will be managed by ESMD. As
noted, Congress cut $200 million from Prometheus in NASA’s FY2006 appropriations act.
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Key Issues for Congress
Many media accounts of the Vision focus on the long term “Moon/Mars” goals, but
nearer term questions of how long to fly the space shuttle and utilize the International
Space Station, and the funding impact on other NASA activities, are an immediate focus.
What Are the Implications of Terminating the Shuttle Program in 2010?
The shuttle program, and debate about its future, are discussed in CRS Report RS21408.
The shuttle is the only U.S. vehicle capable of taking astronauts to and from space.
President Bush directed NASA to retire the shuttle in 2010, when construction of the
International Space Station (ISS) is expected to be finished. Dr. Griffin has repeatedly
expressed his intention to terminate the shuttle program in 2010, whether or not ISS is
completed. Issues include whether announcing a strict date for terminating the shuttle
could create schedule pressure similar to that cited by investigators as a factor in the 2003
space shuttle Columbia tragedy; and whether the United States wants to be dependent on
Russia for human access to space during the gap between the end of the shuttle program
and the availability of the new CEV (see above).
Should U.S. Involvement in ISS End by 2016? The ISS is discussed in more
detail in CRS Issue Brief IB93017. It is being assembled in Earth orbit, and assembly is
expected to be completed in 2010. Plans had called for ISS to be operated for at least 10
years after “assembly complete” as a laboratory for microgravity experiments, with
research benefitting both future NASA exploration missions and people on Earth. Now,
the plan is for NASA to complete its utilization of the ISS by 2016, and narrow its
research program to only that needed to support human space exploration. Some question
whether the U.S. investment in the space station (about $35 billion through FY2005) is
worth the benefits under those circumstances. The NASA authorization act (P.L. 109-155)
seeks to enhance the use of the ISS for scientific research by designating it as a national
laboratory and requiring that 15% of ISS research funds be spent on non-Vision related
research. Other questions include what will happen to the ISS when NASA ends its
participation — will it be turned over to the other ISS partners, privatized, or deorbited?
What Are the Costs and Other Details? The Bush Administration has not
provided a cost estimate for the Vision as a whole, but in 2005, NASA estimated the cost
for returning humans to the Moon by 2018 (its current goal) at $104 billion (excluding $20
billion that would be spent on ISS servicing using the CEV). A September 2004
Congressional Budget Office [http://www.cbo.gov] report cautioned that, based on
historical trends at NASA, the actual cost could be much higher than NASA estimates.
Taking most of the requisite funds from other NASA programs instead of adding new
money for the agency may mitigate concerns that the Vision could increase the deficit or
detract from other national priorities. It raises issues, however, about the impact to those
other NASA programs, and whether the level of funding is adequate to achieve the goals.
Dr. Griffin asserts that he will not take money from space science, earth science, or
aeronautics programs to pay for the Vision, so the source of the needed funds is unclear,
especially since NASA’s budget is projected to rise only at the rate of inflation for the
foreseeable future. Additional questions include the extent to which other countries will
want to participate in the Vision, and whether the Vision is an appropriate goal for NASA.
Some argue that space exploration can be done more safely and less expensively by
robotic probes.

